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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
C. G. HORlVIAN CO., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
VIRGIL J. LLOYD, MARY C.
LLOYD, his wife, and RAMADA
INN OF PROVO, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Case No.
12519

Defendants-Respondents.

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
STATElH:ENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action in which appellant (plaintiff below) claimed a balance due under a written agreement,
and the defendant counterclaimed, claiming a breach of
contract by plaintiff.
DISPOSITION OF TIIE LOWER COURT
The lower court dismissed plaintiff's complaint and
awarded judgment to the defendants on their counterclaim, together with attorney's fees.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintif seeks a reversal of the jmlgrnent a"·arded
to the defendants against the plaintiff.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
On December 31, 1965 the plaintiff, C. G. Horman Co., a Utah corporation, entered into a written
contract with Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc., a Utah corporation, which was also personally signed by Virgil J.
Lloyd and l\Iary C'.
his wife, all of 'vhom constitute the defendants herein. The contract is set forth
in its entirety on pages 6 to 13 of the record.
By the terms of the contract, C. G.Horman Co.
agreed to assist defendants in obtaining financing for
the construction of a motel unit on certain real property
situated in Utah County, State of Utah, which was then
being leased by the defendants Lloyd (as lessee) and
which was proposed to be subleased by them to Ramada
Inn of Provo, Inc., a Utah corporation wholly owne<l
by the defendants Lloyd. The contract further provided
that when the motel was constructed it would be operated solely by Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc. and that
the C. G. Horman Co. would have no interest in the
motel business but that the parties \vould be tenants in
common of the sublease and the improvements to be
situated on the premises. (R.6)
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The contract also contained a formula for dividing
the net income from the operation of the motel, and
also included an option from Horman to Ramada, by
the terms of which Ramada would be entitled to buy out
the interest of Horman for a sum which was to be determined by the following formula:
" (a) During

the continuance of HORMAN'S liability for financing obtained
in the construction of the motel, or any
part thereof, the option price shall be
One Hundred Eleven Thousand
( $111,000.00) Dollars.

"(b) Thereafter, the option price shall be
Fifty Five Thousand Five Hundred
( $55,500.00) Dollars.
"

In the event RAMADA desires to exercise its option prior to the time the
note and mortgage representing the
sums advances [sic] for financing have
been paid in full, RAMADA shall first
obtain from the lender a release of all
underlying obligations on which HORMAN
individually liable." ( R. 9)

Sometime in April, 1966 the parties entered into
an agreement entitled "Modification of Agreement",
by the terms of which the parties referred to their
Agreement dated December 31, 1965 and recognized
that Gerald Horman Construction Company (a differ-
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ent Utah corporation) was to act as general contractor,
and fixed the fee of the Contractor at $67,750.00 and
made certain other financial arrangements between the
parties. ( R. 14)
'Thereafter, the construction of the motel was commenced, and certain disagreements arose between the
Lloyds and C. G. Ilorman Co. with respect to the responsibilities for obtaining additional financing by way
of second mortgages, as the same were needed to complete the construction of the motel.
On February 23, 1967 the parties entered into a
further agreement modifying their Agreement of December 31, 1965. The Agreement recites that the parties
desired "to compromise a full and complete settlement
and release of all claims, demands, causes of action, and
any agreements, written or oral, existing bebveen themselves and their companies, and forever resolve all
claims and demands of themselves individually, through
their above-named companies. . . . " (R. 15) In that
agreement the parties agreed that the Lloyds and Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc. would exercise their option to
purchase the interest of the C. G. Horman Co. in the
motel project. However, a dispute existed between
them, which was recited in the contract, as to the amount
of the purchase price necessary to pay for the exercise
of the option. The parties agreed that the Lloyds would
pay to C. G. Horman Co. the sum of $55,500.00, while
recognizing that C. G. Horman Co. actually claimed
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the sum of $11,000.00 to be due. The Agreement then
recited, as follows:
"A dispute exists between Lloyd-Ramada and
Hormans as to the balance, if any, that should
be paid to C. G. Horman Company upon the
completion of the motel construction; and if
C. G. Horman Company so desires, at any
time within one year, this matter may be submitted to the Fourth Judicial District Court,
on a friendly basis, for the Court's interpretations of the parties' rights under their contract
of December 31, 1965, and any subsequent
modifications." (R. 16)
The contract further provided for the manner in which
C. G. Horman Co. would be paid in the event it recovered a judgment, and also made certain provisions
with respect to _construction funds due the Gerald
Horman Construction Company, which was the general
contractor on the project.
On
23, 1967 the parties entered into another agreement which was designed to further refine
their compromise and settlement agreement of Febru23, 1967. (R. 20-23)

Thereafter, on April 24, 1967, the parties executed
an additional agreement wherein:
a) Lloyds and Ramada waived any claims or
defenses which they might otherwise assert
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to the payment to C. G. Horman Co. of
the first sum of $55,500.00, which sum
was paid to C. G. Horman Co. concurrently with the execution of that agreement.
(R. 24, 25)
b) The parties recognized that the C. G.
Horman Co. claimed that it was actually
entitled to an adidtional sum of $55,500.00,
in the following language :
"Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a waiver of the claim of C. G.
Horman Co. that it is actually entitled to
an additional sum of Fifty-Five Thousand
( $55,500.00) Five Fundred Dollars (constituting $111,000.00 total) for the sale of
its interest in the land and improvements
constituting the said motel complex, nor
shall anything contained herein be construed as a waiver of any defense or right
... of setoff which could be asserted by
LLOYDS-RAMADA in the event of
suit by C. G. Horman Company with respect to the said claim." (Emphasis added)
(R. 25)
That Agreement further provided as follows:
"5.

The parties hereto accept the general
construction of the motel building completed thus far as being satisfactorily
performed and substantially in accordance with the plans and specifications in-
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eluding addendums No. 1, No. 2 and No.
3 (to be submitted by Gerald Horman
Horman Construction Company). The
parties further agree that they will accept
the future construction work to be performed by Gerald Horman Construction
Company if in accordance with the plans,
specifications, revisions and addendums."
(R. 26)

At the time of the Agreement of April 24, 1967
the motel structure was substantially completed, and
the final inspection was performed by the Architect on
:May 1, 1967. The final inspection check list was drawn
up on
3, 1967 and subsequently delivered to the
Contractor, who satisfactorily completed all require·l
corrections by June 13, 1967. (R. 122)
Upon completion of the construction of the motti
building the Lloyds and Ramada Inn failed
ref used to pay the Gerald Horman Construction' Company the balance remaining due for services performed
by it as general contractor for the construction of the
said motel property, and on or about August 8, 1967
L.;.erald Horman Construction filed a mechanic's lien iiJ
the Office of the County Recorder of Utah County,
and commenced an action (Civil No. 31,379) in the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County on or about October 19, 1967 against all persons
claiming an interest in the property, including Virgil .T.
Lloyd, .Mary C. Lloyd, his wife, and Ramada Inn of

8

Provo, Inc. In that action the Lloyds and Ramada Inn
filed a third-party complaint against C. G. Horman Co.
(R. 112 and 113)
Subsequently the defendants amended their counterclaim in that action and alleged that the C. G. Horman Co. was obligated under its contract of December
31, 1965 to assist in obtaining the financing for the construction of the motel project, including the obligation
of assuming individual liability on the mortgage loans,
and that they failed, neglected and refused to sign the
mortgage loans as required for the financing of the
project, and sought a return of the sum of $55,500.00
which C. G. Horman Co. had received at the time of the
execution of the contract on April 24, 1967. (R. 115)
The trial of Civil No. 31,379 (Gerald Horman
Construction Company vs. Virgil J. Lloyd, et ux, et al.)
was held before the Honorable Maurice Harding on
July l, 2 and 3, 1969. During that trial both the defendant Virgil J. Lloyd and his attorney, Leon Frazier,
took the stands as witnesses and testified with respect to
the allegations of the Lloyd's counterclaim and thirdparty complaint, including the matter relating to the
alleged breach of contract by the C. G. Horman Co.
At the conclusion of the trial the Court awarded judgment in favor of Gerald Horman Construction Company on its complaint, and dismissed the Lloyd's
counterclaim. With respect to the third-party complaint
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of the Lloyds against C. G. Horman Co., the Court, in
its Findings of Fact, found as follows:
"7. That pursuant to the Agreement of December 31, 1965 a First Mortgage secured by a
Promissory Note in the amount of $615,000.00
was executed by C. G. Horman Co. and Virgil
J. Lloyd and Mary C. Lloyd, his wife; that
thereafter a dspute developed between C. G.
Horman Co. on the one hand and Virgil J.
Lloyd and Mary C. Lloyd, his wife, on the
other hand, as to the obligation, if any, which
C. G. Horman Co. had to execute a Second
l\1ortgage commitment in the amount of
$60,000.00; that in fact no such Second Mortgage commitment had even been obtained, and
the parties compromised and settled that
dispute by the execution of an Agreement
dated February 23, 1967, a copy of which was
introduced into evidence as EXHIBIT P-7.
That as a part of the compromise and
settlement of the said dispute, C. G. Horman
Co. agreed to sell its interest in the motel
project to Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc., Virgil
J. Lloyd and Mary C. Llloyd, his wife, but
the parties were unable to agree on the purchase price. That the parties did agree that
C. G. Horman Co. was to receive the sum of
$55,500.00 but reserved for subsequent determination by resort to the courts, if necessary,
the question of whether C. G. Horman Co. was
entitled to any additional sum as the purchase
"8.
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price of its interest. That a separate action has
been commenced in the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah
County, State of Utah, as Civil No. 31,7.52
to resolve that dispute. That except for the
matters of additional sums, if any, due C. G.
Horman Co. on account of the purchase price
of its interest in the motel project by Ramada
Inn of Provo, Inc., Virgil J. Lloyd and iJ'Iary
C. Lloyd, his wife, the parties (that is, C. G.
Horman Co., Radama Inn of Provo, Inc.,
Virgil J. Lloyd and JJI ary C. Lloyd, his wifc)
compromised and settled and fully released all
claims existing between themselves by the
terms of the Agreement of February 23, 1967
as implemented by an Agreement between the
same parties dated March 23, 1967, a cop,1J of
which was admitted in evidence as EXHIBIT
P-8, and an Agreement dated April 24, 1967,
a copy of which was admitted in evidence as
EXHIBIT P-11." (Emphasis added.)
(R. 120-121)
No appeal was taken from the judgment in Civil
No. 31,379, which became final in August 1969.
Prior to the trial in Civil No. 31,379, C. G. Horman Co. commenced the instant action (on February
21, 1968) . The instant action was still pending trial
at the time of the judgment in Civil No. 31 ,379.
In the instant action, the defendants Virgil .T.
Lloyd and
C. Lloyd, his wife, and Ramada Inn
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of Provo, Inc. filed an answer and counterclaim, on
February 21, 1969. In their fourth counterclaim in the
instant action, the defendants set out against the C. G.
llorman Co., almost verbatim, the identical issues which
they had set up against the C. G. Horman Co. in their
amended third-party complaint in Civil No. 31,379,
again alleging that the C. G. Horman Co. had breached
its contract to assist in obtaining the financing for the
construction of the motel project. (R. 44) C. G. Horman Co. filed a reply but did not set up the defense of
res judicata, since the judgment in Civil No. 31,379
had not then been rendered.
On September 16, 1969 plaintiff therein filed a
for Summary Judgment (R. 63) after the
Judgment in Civil No. 31,379 became final, based upon
the files and records in this matter and also upon the
decision of the Court in Civil No. 31,379, wherein the
Court had found, as quoted above, that the parties had
compromised all disputes between themselves, excepting only the question as to whether C. G. Horman Co.
was entitled to any additional sums for the exercise of
the option by the Lloyds and Ramada Inn of Provo,
Inc. On April 10, 1970 the Court entered an order denying plaintiff's
for Summary Judgment and
setting the matter for trial September 23, 1970. (R. 70)
The trial of this matter was held before the Hon.
Joseph E. Nelson, Judge. At the conclusion of the
trial, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision (R.
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77) and subsequently entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment (R. 78-82), wherein
the Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint and awarded
defendants judgment on their counterclaim in the
amount of $14,000.00 "because of the breach of contract by the plaintiff, C. G. Horman Co." ·(R. 82),
together with attorney's fees in the amount of $6,000.00.
From that judgment the defendant appeals to the Supreme Court.

OF POINTS
POINT I. THE TRIAL C 0 UR T
ERRED IN GRANTING THE JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS ON
THEIR COUNTERCLAilVI.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL C 0 U R T
ERRED IN GRANTING THE JUDGMENT TO THE DEFENDANTS ON
THEIR COUNTERCLAIM.
The appellant respectfully contends that the trial
court in the instant matter should have dismissed the
counterclaim of the defendants upon the ground that
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the matters contained therein were the same issues previously litigated between the same parties in Civil No.
31,379 and had become res judicata between the parties
to the instant action, by reason of the prior adjudication
of Civil No. 31,379.
This Court has held, along with all other jurisdictions, that a prior judgment by a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea, a bar,
or as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties
upon the same matter directly in question in another
court.
v. lJfatthews, 102 Utah 428, 132 P.2d
111.
In its inception, Civil No. 31,379 was a suit between
Gerald Horman Construction Company (plaintiff
therein) and Lloyds and Ramada Inn of Provo, Inc.
(defendants therein and in the instant action) . However, the defendants enlarged the action by filing a
third-party complaint against C. G. Horman Co. (plaintiff herein).
A reading at the third-party complaint filed by the
Lloyds against C. G. Horman Co. in Civil No. 31,379
( R. 115) and the counterclaim filed by the Lloyds
against C. G. Horman Co. in the instant action (R. 44)
will disclose that they were identical in all material respects. Both pleadings were based upon the same transactions between the same parties, both allege the same
acts as giving rise to the same causes of action, both
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required the same evidence, and both sought the same relief. (Compare R. 44 with R. 115)
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a decision of
the matters at issue in the first case tried will necessarily
resolve all of the same matters raised in the second case
tried.
In the controversies between the parties herein, the
first case tried was Civil No. 31,379, which was tried
before Judge I\laurice Harding on July 1, 2, and 3,
1969. The judgment was entered in that matter on July
18, 1969, and since no appeal was taken it became final
on August 17, 1969. Promptly thereafter the plaintiff
herein asserted the defense of res judicata by filing a
motion for summary judgment in this matter (R. 63),
v.rhich was denied on April 10, 1970 (R. 70). Plaintiff
also reasserted this defense at the time of trial, and in
plaintiff's memorandum filed prior to the decision of
the court. The defense was further raised by plaintiff
in its motion to amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Judgment (R. 84).
In his decision in Civil No. 31,379, Judge Harding
recognized the existence of the instant action, which
was still awaiting trial at that time, and held that the
parties ( C. G. Horman Co. and the Lloyds and Ramada
Inn of Provo, Inc.) had "compromised and settled and
fully released all claims existing between themselves"
(excepting only "the matters of additional sums, if
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any, due C. G. Horman Co. on account of the purchase
price of its interest in the motel project"). (R. 121)
Later, in the findings, Judge Harding also stated that
the dismissal of the third-party complaint was "without
prejudice to the rights of ... (defendants) to state a
or right of setoff against C. G. Horman Co.
in C'ivil No. 31,752 [the instant case] . . . . " (R. 124)
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, it was clearly the intention of the Court that
the judgment rendered in Civil No. 31,379 should bind
the parties in the instant action, and limit the issue herein to the (1uestion of what additional sums, if any, were
clue to C. G. Horman Co., and to limit the defendants
to the right to state a defense or right of setoff only.
The dismissal of the third-party complaint in Civil
No. 31,379 subjert only to the right of the Lloyds to
assert a defense or setoff thus constituted an adjudication of all matters contained in defendants' counterclaim in this action and precluded the court in this action
from granting judgment to defendants on their counterclaim.
This court man>r times has recognized under the
doctrine of res judicata that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits is conclusive of causes
of action and of facts or isues thereby litigated in all
other '.ldions between the same parties.

In East 1llill Creek TVater Co. v. Salt Lake City,
108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863, this court held that a de-
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e1s10n m an action bars a second action between the
same parties on all points raised and directly litigated
where the cause of action is the same in both bases, as
it was here.
In JJlcCarthy v. State, I U. 2d 20.5, 265 P.2d 387,
this court said:
" ... The isue having been squarely presented
and determined, its is res judicata as between
these parties.
". . . The issue was settled by the Federal
Court, as above indicated, and it was not the
prerogative of the State District Court nor of
this Court on appeal to review or reverse that
decision. 'Vhether its judgment was right or
wrong, it stands unassailed and is binding upon
the parties. Any other view would create uncertainty, by undermining the conclusive character of judgments and would permit the revival of litigation once terminated; consequences which it was the very purpose of the
doctrine of res judicata to a''oid." ( 265 P.2d
at 389)
In Todaro v. Gardner, 3 U. 2d 404, 285 P.2d 839,
this court recognized that a prior judgment between
the same parties is res judicata as to all matters decided
by 'the court, and recognized that the doctrine of res
judicata did not apply to matters which the court "ex·
pressly refused to determine." (285 P.2d 841) This

17
\Vould indicate that the Court in the instant case was
pt·ecluded from determining any matters except those
expressly
by Judge Harding:
1) What additional amounts, if any, were due
to C. G. Horman Co. (R 121);
2) Any defenses or offsets which the Lloyds
might assert to the payment of any sums
found due to C. G. Horman Co. (R. 124)
Judge Harding's decision, however, prevented the trial
court in the instant case from granting defendants any
re('OYery under their counterclaim.

In [(night 'L'. Flat Top llfining Co., 6 U. 2d 51,
30.5 P.2d 503, this court stated:

"It is a fundamental principle of jurisprud-

ence that material facts or questions which
were in issue in a former action, and which
were admitted or judicially determined, are
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered
therein, and that such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same
parties or their privies, regardless of the form
the issue may take in the subsequent action."
(Emphasis added.) (305 P.2d at 506)

The reasons usually enunciated as the basis for the
judicially created doctrine of res judicata are that public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time,
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and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace and
order of society, all require that stability should be accorded to judgments, that controversies once decided on
their merits shall remain in repose, that inconsistent
judicial decisions shall not be made on the same set of
facts, and that there be an end to litigation which, without the doctrine of res judicata, would be endless. (See
46 Am.J ur.2d, Judgments, § 395, pp. 559-561).
All of these considerations are present in this matter. The lower court in this case granted a judgment
against the plaintiff upon facts and pleadings which in
all material respects were identical to those in the prior
case (Civil No. 31,379) which Judge Harding had
dismissed, holding that the same parties had compromised, settled and fully released the identical claims.
In so doing, the lovver court in this matter committed
error and its judgments hould be reversed.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Attorney's fees are only awarded as an incident
of a recovery of other claims. Consequently, appellant
respectfully submits that all of the authority cited in
Point I also supports appellant's contention that the
trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to defendants, because the prior judgment in effect held that
the parties compromised and settled all matters which
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coulJ from the basis for an award (including the matter
of attorney's fees).
In addition, it should be pointed out that only the
',•;ritten Agreements of February 23, 1967 (R. 16) and
!\larch 23, 1967 (R. 20, 21) contain any agreement of
the parties to pay any attorney's fee. 'Vhile the Agreerreut of J'if arch 23, 1967 contains a statement imposing
attorney's fees upon a party defaulting that agreement
( R. 21 ) , no default in the terms of that agreement were
either rleafled or proved by defendants.
\ n examination of the terms of that agreement
in licate that the agreement proYided that the Lloyds
Hamada Inn of Provo, Inc. were to pay C. G.
Horman Co. the sum of $5.5,500.00, and in the Agreement of April 24, 1967 (R. 24, 25) the defendants
\\'aiYe:l all claims against that payment.
The Agreement of l\11arch 23, 1967 also recognized
by its express terms the right of C. G. Horman Co. to
commence the instant action upon its claim to additional
sums, so that the filing of this action did not constitute
a default. C. G. Horman Co. also waived any right to
assert any interest in the real property. An examination
of the pleadings herein will disclose that C. G. Horman
Co. claimed only the right to a portion of the net rental
arising from the sublease of the premises,
,,·hich it had a right to do under the agreement of April
24, 1967 (R. 25).
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In short, defendants did not even claim that C. G-.
Horman Co. breached its agreements contained in the
Agreement of :March 23, 1967.
Furthermore, it was expressly agreed between the
parties in the Agreement of February 23, 1967, that in
the event this suit were filed:
"Lloyd-Ramada agree to retain and pay Leon
M. Frazier to handle said suit. If Honnans
desire to retain a separate attorney, they agree
to pay their own attorney's fees." (R. 16)
(Emphasis added.)
Consequently, it was error for the Court to allow
·attorney's fees to the defendant in any amount.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully
that this court should reverse the judgment of
the lower court, and dismiss the counterclaim of defendants in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN G. l\fARSI-IALL

Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant

